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Abstract
In an OLG model with multiple steady states we analyse the impact of en-
dogenous environmental policies on the relevance of history and expectations
for the equilibrium selection. In a polluting regime environmental preferences
cause an increasing energy tax which raises the risk that the economy transits
to the inferior equilibrium under pessimistic expectations. However, higher
environmental preferences imply an earlier switch to the clean energy regime.
Then, the conflict between production and environmental preferences is re-
solved and the prospects to select the superior equilibrium improve, since
positive expectations become more relevant. In an empirical analysis we find
that people with environmental preferences tend to have more optimistic ex-
pectations about economic development. Using these findings to analyse the
steady state dynamics implies that agents with environmental preferences sup-
port higher energy taxes and switch faster to clean production. Due to their
optimism, the likelihood to reach the superior stable steady state increases.
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1 Introduction
In the absence of technological alternatives, societies with higher ecological preferences
support stricter measures to protect the environment. Although this trade-off between
pollution and production may be solved in a welfare maximizing manner, the economic
performance in such societies may be constrained by stronger regulations and higher taxes.
This view is contrasted by our finding that individuals caring a lot about the environment
tend to have more optimistic expectations about future economic perspectives. As it can
be seen in figure 1, participants of the Eurobarometer 2015 survey who care a lot about the
environment, are on average much more optimistic regarding the economic development
of their country compared to any other group of respondents who consider other problems
more important. Such influence of positive expectations about the economy runs against
the above mentioned widespread belief that environmental policies hamper the economic
performance. Everything else equal, a less ecological society imposing lower taxes on
pollution may perform worse compared to a more ecological society imposing higher
taxes if the latter is more optimistic with respect to future economic perspectives and
thus more willing to invest (a phenomenon known as “self-fulfilling prophecy”). This
argument underlines the necessity to analyse the joint interaction between environmental
policies and the relevance of expectations for the future economic performance, a feature
that has been largely ignored by the existing literature on climate change and the energy
transition.1
In this paper, we analyse (a) how green preferences affect the economic performance,
if expectations, instead of history alone, matter for the equilibrium selection process.
1Workhorse models in the literature like Acemoglu et al. (2012) are based on history dependent
evolutions where initial conditions trigger the transition to a long-run equilibrium. Because learning
effects are sector specific, history favors the larger sector which is usually the dirty sector of the economy.
To change the pattern of development, policy is needed to give the green sector the decisive initial push.
Mejden et al. (2016) extends Acemoglu et al. (2012) by introducing expectations in a directed technical
change framework, where and this is the distinguishing feature to our framework, changes in expectations
stem from new outside information about technical opportunities, while - in our case - agents are fully
informed about all the different technology options from the beginning.
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Figure 1: Relationship between environmental awareness and economic expectations in 33 European
countries. The plot shows the ratio of number of optimists to number of pessimists for each named issue
area (for description of data see section 8). The country average ratio is highest for people who are most
concerned about the environment and the climate and significantly higher than the overall mean (dashed
line) with t = 2.986, df = 32, p-value = 0.002691.
Data: Eurobarometer 85, 2016.
Moreover, as the decarbonisation of the production process becomes increasingly a viable
option, the traditional conflict between economic performance and green preferences may
be resolved in the near future. We therefore seek to answer in addition (b) how green
preferences affect the regime switch from dirty to clean production and the economic
performance within the green regime. We analyze those research questions within an
overlapping generations (OLG) framework that allows the evolution of an economy be-
ing driven by both history and by expectations. We build our theoretical approach on
Bretschger et al. (2017). While Bretschger et al. (2017) analyse exogenous policy instru-
ments in a given energy regime, we introduce endogenous environmental policies and an
endogenous regime switch from a polluting to a green energy regime. This allows us to
analyze how green preferences affect the economic performance within a polluting and a
green energy regime and the regime switch from the former to the latter.2 Our theoret-
ical approach also refers to the seminal contribution of Krugman (1991) who shows in
2We will detail further below, how during the transition to the steady state endogenous policies shape
the state space in which expectations matter. Moreover, we allow in contrast to Bretschger et al. (2017)
for stock pollution. We go beyond existing literature by showing how environmental quality affects affects
through environmental policies the role of expectations.
2
a (partial-analytic) model that history and expectations may both matter for economic
development. Schaefer et al. (2014) build on Krugman (1991) and consider a general
equilibrium allowing for capital and labor mobility but neglect in contrast to Bretschger
et al. (2017) factor accumulation. None of this papers allows, however, for endogenous
policies and their interaction with the importance of expectations for the equilibrium
selection process. The second contribution is an econometric analysis of the relationship
between expectations and green preferences with data from a Swiss survey. By doing so
we can discuss the theoretical implications in light of the empirical data.
Conceptually, we consider a two-period overlapping generations model with two pro-
duction regimes: a polluting regime with an endogenous energy tax and a clean regime
subject to switching costs. In the polluting regime, higher ecological preferences induce
a higher energy tax. Higher taxes reduce the impact of positive expectations for the
equilibrium selection process and increase the risk that the economy transits under pes-
simistic expectations to the inferior equilibrium. This mechanism is aggravated the more
environmental-friendly agents are, since this increases the energy tax further. On the
other hand, higher preferences for the protection of the environment imply an earlier
switch to the clean energy regime. In this regime, the conflict between production and
environmental preferences is not only resolved, but the prospects to select the superior
equilibrium have increased, since this regime gives more space to expectations compared
to history, and agents with higher ecological preferences are more optimistic towards fu-
ture economic development. In order to confront this model implication with the real
world, we exploit data from a large-scale pre-election survey in Switzerland. We analyse
the relationship between attitudes towards more stringent environmental protection and
expectations about future economic development and find that they are positively corre-
lated. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis that looks at environmental opinion and
economic expectations as independent variables. Instead, the vast majority of opinion
3
questionnaires force participants to prioritise either environmental protection measures
or economic growth policies. As such, they create a negative relationship per se: if peo-
ple have to choose between the two, they can never be positively related. Our data
analysis however indicates that people assume both: surveyees who have strong green
preferences are also more likely to have more optimistic expectations about the economic
development.
The theoretical and empirical results combined allow us to conclude that greener
societies may achieve an earlier switch to clean production, and are also more likely to
achieve the superior steady state of the economy due to their positive expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the
structure of our model and establish the equilibrium thereafter in section 3. In section
4, we present the menu of environmental policy instruments. Section 5 describes the
dynamic behaviour of our economy and summarises the steady state(s). In section 6, we
perform numerical experiments to assess the impact of different degrees of environmental
preferences on the relevance of history or expectations. In section 7 we discuss the
robustness of our results with respect to some simplifying assumptions regarding the
evolution of environmental quality. In section 8, we show the results of the empirical
data analysis and finally, section 9 summarises and concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Households
In this setting time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, ...,∞. In each period (t) our
economy is populated by a [0, 1]-continuum of households. Each individual lives for two
periods: adulthood and old-age and is replaced by a young individual at the end of the
second period of life. Agents’ time endowment is normalised to one and each adult agent
supplies in exchange for the wage income (wt) one unit of time inelastically to the labor
4
market. Agents consume ct during adulthood and save the amount st in order to cover
old-age consumption (ct+1) during retirement. Moreover, agents appreciate next period’s
quality of the environment represented by Qt+1.
3 Lifetime utility is thus specified as
ut = ln(ct) + ρ ln(ct+1) + ε ln(Qt+1), (1)
with 0 < ρ < 1 representing the discount factor of future consumption. ε captures the
weight attached to environmental quality, i.e. the strength of environmental preferences.
Denoting the gross-interest rate by Rt+1, the budget constraint of an adult agent is given
as
wt = ct + st, (2)
and stRt+1 = ct+1, such that the present value of lifetime expenditures equals lifetime
earnings, i.e. wt = ct +
ct+1
Rt+1
.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields
ct =
1
1 + ρ
· wt, (3)
ct+1
Rt+1
=
ρ
1 + ρ
· wt. (4)
2.2 Firms and pollution
Final output (Y ) can be produced within two energy regimes: Regime d makes use of
polluting energy (Ed) as an intermediate input while regime c applies a green technology
which produces clean energy (Ec) without harming the environment. The level of pollu-
tants (P ) adversely affects environmental quality Q as specified further below, and total
3We omit Qt because of notational convenience. Q is a state variable given at date t such that
only the next period’s quality can be influenced by the current adult generation. This is a reasonable
and common assumption since environmental policies affect the environment with a significant delay.
The implementation of Qt into the utility function would therefore just affect the utility level without
delivering further insights.
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factor productivity, such that
Yj,t = P
−γ
t Fj,t, γ ∈ (0, 1), j = c, d, (5)
with Fj,t denoting the applied technology, polluting or clean, and γ denoting the adverse
impact of pollutants on factor productivity. Pollution reflected by the level of emissions
depends on the amount of dirty energy entering the production of final output. If the
green technology is applied or the level of polluting energy falls short of a certain threshold
level (Ecritd ), the pollution level equals a minimum level ψ˜ > 0
Pt =
{
ψEd,t, if Ed,t > E
crit
d
ψ˜, if 0 ≤ Ed,t ≤ Ecritd or j = c.
(6)
Technology Fj is used by a [0, 1]-continuum of identical and fully competitive firms em-
ploying physical capital (K) and a range of differentiated energy services (ωj ∈ [0, Nj])
with xj(ωj) denoting the quantity of intermediate ωj and Nj representing the number of
available differentiated energy services, in energy regime d or c.4 The production function
of a representative firm reads
Fj,t = (Kj,t)α
(∫ Nj,t
0
xj,t(ωj)
1
mj,t dωj
)mj,t(1−α)
, α ∈ (0, 1). (7)
Note that mj is endogenous and determines the elasticity of substitution, sj =
mj
mj−1 , for
each pair of intermediates and thus the markup over marginal production costs. Build-
ing on Gali (1994) and Gali (1995) and the underlying empirical literature, the inten-
sity of competition between (intermediate) firms increases in a growing economy so that
s′j(Kj) > 0. This feature may generate multiple steady states without relying on increas-
ing returns to scale. Capital investment (Ij) is subject to convex capital-adjustment costs
4Energy services comprise, apart from the mere supply of energy to firms, highly specialized hard-
and software solutions for certain energy types provided by engineering firms with the aim to optimize
a firm’s energy use. Services may differ between green and polluting energies, due different degrees
of technological maturity and certain peculiarities associated with certain energy types like a higher
volatility of supply immanent to green energies.
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in the spirit of Abel (1982) and Hayashi (1982). Firms maximize the present value of
their cash flows and take the evolution of the interest rate (r) and wages (w) as given,
i.e. the representative firm maximizes
max
{xj,t,Ij,t,Kj,t+1}
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + r)t
{
Yj,t −
∫ ∞
0
pxj ,t(ωj)xj,t(ωj)dωj − Ij,t
[
1 + θ
( Ij,t
Kj,t
)η]}
, (8)
subject to: Kj,t+1 = Ij,t + (1− δ)Kj,t, (9)
with η, θ > 0. δ ∈ [0, 1] represents the depreciation rate of physical capital and Kj,0 > 0
is given.
Energy services are heterogeneous and its production is subject to fixed costs (φj)
capturing the overhead cost in units of the intermediate for a firm to enter the market.
The producer of intermediate variety ωj acts under monopolistic competition and uses
energy ej(ωj) as well as labor lj(ωj) as inputs to produce a level of gross output
xj(ωj) + φj = Bj · lj(ωj)1−β · ej(ωj)β, (10)
with β ∈ (0, 1) and Bj > 0 representing the total factor productivity in producing energy
services. Denote marginal production costs by cxj(ωj), operating profits write
pixj(ωj) = [pxj(ωj)− cxj(ωj)] · xj(ωj), (11)
such that profit maximizing behavior implies the usual relationship between prices and
mark-up over marginal production costs
pxj(ωj) = mj(Kj) · cxj(ωj). (12)
Dirty energy is imported while clean energy is produced domestically, according to the
7
following linear production function
ec(ωc) = BE,c · lE,c(ωc), (13)
with BE,c > 0 representing the factor productivity in the production of green energy.
5
3 Equilibrium
The model incorporates the global dimension of the markets for (polluting) fossil fuels.
Accordingly, we assume that energy prices (net of taxes) of fossils to be predetermined
for a single country and consider the case of a small open economy where the energy price
in the dirty regime (pEd) is determined by world market conditions and domestic policy,
i.e. we have
pEd,t = p¯Ed + τt (14)
where p¯Ed is the world market price and τt the tax of fossils set by policy to be determined
further below. Similarly, the analogous small country assumption for the capital market
leads to a world interest rate which is given for a single country, i.e. we have r = r¯. The
subsequent lemma defines the equilibrium levels of output in either energy regime.
Lemma 1.
(i) The equilibrium level of final output in regime d is obtained as
Yd,t = A˜d,t
( Bd
md,t
) 1−α
γ˜
(
Kd,t
)α
γ˜
, (15)
where A˜d,t =
(
β˜
p¯Ed+τt
) β˜−γ
γ˜
(
ψ
τt
)− γ
γ˜
and γ˜ = 1− β˜ + γ.
5We abstract from physical capital in the production of clean energy for notational convenience. Of
course, this assumption affects the opportunity costs of green technologies, but apart from that, the main
arguments of our research remain unaffected.
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(ii) In regime c, the level of final output reads as
Yc,t = A˜c
( Bc
mc,t
)1−α(
Kc,t
)α
, (16)
with A˜c = ψ
−γ
[
(BE,cβ)
β(1− β)1−β
]1−α
.
In light of Lemma 1, it is important to note that A˜c is time invariant, while A˜d,t is
time-varying as long as the tax on polluting energy (τt) is changing over time. The energy
tax is determined by the preferences of the representative household and discussed in the
subsequent section.
4 Policy
Environmental policy in period t is determined by the adults’ preferences. The govern-
ment observes the equilibrium of the economy and takes the decisions of the represen-
tative adult household as given. Essentially, the government can implement two policy
scenarios.
1) An energy tax in the polluting regime.
2) A regime switch to the clean technology which requires set-up costs in terms of
infrastructure denoted by Ω > 0.
Environmental quality (Q) is adversely affected by the cumulated stock of pollutants
(S) in the sense that Qt+1 = Q¯ − St+1, where Q¯ reflects the level of environmental
quality if St+1 = 0. Denoting further by δQ the regenerative capacity of the environment,
environmental quality evolves according to
Qt+1 = δQQ¯+ (1− δQ)Qt − Pt.6 (17)
For the sake of clarity we constrain our analysis for the moment to δQ = 1, i.e. envi-
6Noting that St+1 = (1− δQ)St + Pt yields together with Qt+1 = Q¯− St+1 eq.(17).
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ronmental quality is a flow and regenerates completely from one period to another, such
that the dimensions of the state space are reduced. We relax this assumption in section 7.
The government has knowledge about the impact of emissions on the environmental
quality
Qt+1 =
{
Q¯− κψEd,t, if j = d,
Q¯− κψ˜ = Qmax if 0 ≤ Ed,t ≤ Ecritd or j = c,
(18)
Q¯ represents the highest possible level of environmental quality in the absence of human
interventions. Along with economic activities the maximum attainable level of environ-
mental quality depends on the technology use, i.e. Qmax ≤ Q¯.
Observing the equilibrium and the preferences of a representative adult household,
the government maximizes
Vd,t = (1 + ρ) lnwd,t + ε ln
(
Q¯− κψEd,t
)
+ ρ˜, (19)
with ρ˜ = ρ ln(1 + ρ) + ρ ln
(
ρR
1+ρ
)
and wd,t = (1− α)(1− β)Yd,tLd , if the dirty technology is
active.
In case that j = c lifetime utility reads as
Vc,t = (1 + ρ) ln(wc,t − Ω) + ε ln(Qmax) + ρ˜, (20)
and wc,t = (1− α)Yc,t.
The economy conducts a regime switch to the clean technology, if
Vc,t ≥ Vd,t, (21)
The subsequent proposition summarizes the reaction of τt in response to changes in the
capital stock and shifts in the preferences for environmental quality.
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Proposition 1.
(i) The first-order condition of the government reads
∂Vd,t
∂τt
=
(1 + ρ)
wd,t
∂wd,t
∂A˜d,t
∂A˜d,t
∂τt
− εκψ
∂Ed,t
∂τt
Q¯− κψEd,t ≤ 0, (22)
where
∂A˜d,t
∂τt
,
∂Ed,t
∂τt
< 0 and
∂wd,t
∂A˜d,t
> 0.
(ii) There exists a parameter set Γ, such that
∂Vd,t
∂τt
< 0, if Kd,t ≤ Kcrit and thus τt = 0.
In contrast,
∂Vd,t
∂τt
= 0, if Kd,t > K
crit and thus τt > 0. The preferred tax rate is
increasing in the capital stock and environmental preferences, i.e. ∂τt
∂Kd,t
, ∂τt
∂
> 0.
In light of the previous proposition, the economy must surpass a certain level of pro-
duction, and thus emissions, reflected by a critical level of physical capital (Kcrit) beyond
which the representative household is going to support a positive energy tax. Since en-
vironmental damages are increasing with the production level, the marginal utility gain
related to an improvement in environmental quality is increasing compared to the utility
loss from taxation. Hence, the energy tax is increasing in Kd,t. Stronger environmental
preferences (ε) give a higher weight to the marginal gain associated to the improvement
in environmental quality, such that the supported energy tax increases in ε.
As regards the regime switch from the dirty to the green regime, we establish in light
of (21) the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The economy conducts a regime switch from the dirty to the clean tech-
nology regime, if Vc,t ≥ Vd,t, such that
wc,t − Ω ≥ wd,t(
Qmax
Qt+1
) ε
(1+ρ)
. (23)
Thus, the likelihood of a regime switch to the clean technology is positively affected
by the productivity of the clean technology (A˜c) relative to the dirty technology (A˜d,t),
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where the latter is inversely related to τt. Clearly, the likelihood of a regime switch is
adversely affected by the magnitude of the switching costs per household as captured by
Ω.7 Moreover, the timing of the regime switch is affected by the state of environmental
quality (Qt+1) under regime d as compared to its maximum level (Q
max) if the clean
technology in regime c was active. If the polluting technology deteriorates the quality
of the environment quickly during the transition, a regime switch becomes c.p. more
likely. For any given ratio of environmental qualities in the clean and the dirty regime
(Q
max
Qt+1
) as well as productivities, the regime switch will be delayed in societies attaching
a comparatively higher weight to consumption (1 + ρ), whereas societies with a high
ecological preference (ε) switch earlier. Finally, apart from the direct impact of ε on
the lifetime utility arbitrage condition (Vc,t ≥ Vd,t) there is an indirect channel at work:
Societies with higher ecological preferences (ε) impose a higher energy tax which reduces
the productivity of the dirty technology (A˜d,t) as compared to the clean technology. This
indirect channel reinforces the direct impact of ε.
5 Dynamics and steady state(s)
In this section, we analyze the dynamic behavior of our economy and establish necessary
conditions for the emergence of multiple steady states. We specify how the endogenous
energy tax interferes with both, the emergence of multiple steady states and the relevance
of history as well as expectations to reach a stable steady state.
Lemma 2. The dynamics of the economy are governed by a two dimensional system of
7Note that Ω represents a short cut since we abstract from physical capital in terms of infrastructure
built up by the state and intertemporal deficit spending for the sake of simplicity. The important notion
is captured by Ω in the sense that at least one generation will carry a substantial financial burden.
Intertemporal deficit spending and a capital stock built up by the state are clearly more realistic but
complicate the structure of the model considerably without delivering further insights.
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nonlinear difference equations.
Kj,t+1 = Ij,t + (1− δ)Kj,t, (24)
qj,t+1 =
1 + r
1− δ qj,t −
1
1− δ
{
∂Yj,t+1
∂Kj,t+1
+ θη
( Ij,t+1
Kj,t+1
)1+η}
, (25)
where
Ij,t =
( qj,t − 1
(1 + η)θ
) 1
η
Kj,t (26)
and
∂Yd,t+1
∂Kd,t+1
= αA˜d,t+1
[( Bd
md,t+1
)1−α
Kαd,t+1
] 1−αβ
γ˜
K−1j,t+1, (27)
with γ˜ = 1− β˜ + γ and τd,t ≥ 0 is determined by (55), if j = d. If j = c
∂Yc,t+1
∂Kc,t+1
= αA˜c
( Bc
mc,t+1
)1−α
Kα−1c,t+1. (28)
In steady state, Kj,t+1 = Kj,t = Kj,∗ and qj,t+1 = qj,t = qj,∗, such that in light of (24)
investments equal the amount of depreciated capital
Ij,∗ = δKj,∗, (29)
which implies with (26) that
qj,∗ = 1 + (1 + η)θδη. (30)
On the other hand, (25) implies together with (26)
qj,t+1 =
1 + r
1− δ qj,t −
1
1− δ
{
∂Yj,t+1
∂Kj,t+1
+ θη
(qj,t+1 − 1
(1 + η)θ
) 1+η
η
}
, (31)
which determines implicitly qj,t+1 = qj,t+1(Kj,t, qj,t). Finally, (31) yields in steady state
qj,∗ =
1
r + δ
[
∂Yj,∗
∂Kj,∗
+ θηδ1+η
]
. (32)
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The steady state capital stock is determined by (30) and (32). As τt = τt(Kd,t), the
steady state level of the tax rate is τ∗ = τ∗(Kd,∗) ≥ 0 and thus constant.
The emergence of multiple steady states hinges on the endogeneity of markups. Since
mj = mj(Kj), with m
′
j(Kj) < 0, the marginal product of capital is not necessarily
declining in Kj, see Lemma 2. Thus, qj,∗ as defined by (32) may intersect (30 ) more
than once in the {Kj; qj}-plane, which gives rise to multiple steady states. From Eq.
(26) and Eq. (30), we observe that qj ≷ qj,∗ implies (Ij,t/Kj,t) ≷ δ, such that in light
of Eq. (24), ∆Kj,t+1 ≷ 0. This situation is reflected by the horizontal vector arrows
in Figure 2. Above (below) the ∆qj = 0-locus determined by Eq. (31), the sum of the
marginal product of capital and marginal installation cost,
∂Yj,t+1
∂Kj,t+1
+ θη
(
Ij
Kj
)1+η
, is for a
given qj below (above) the level that would assure ∆qj = 0. Thus for the region above
the ∆qj = 0-locus it follows that ∆qj,t+1 > 0, while below we have ∆qj,t+1 < 0.
In Figure 2, this situation is characterized by the vertical arrows. We therefore con-
clude that the case of three steady states in the figure is characterized by two exterior
saddle-point stable steady states and one interior unstable steady state. In the dirty
regime, the steady state with the highest capital stock implies the highest value of net
output and consumption given any level of initial wealth. However, as utility is negatively
affected by pollution, highest output does not imply highest welfare; it depends on the
shape of the utility function, specifically on the parameter ε.
Depending on the characteristics of the interior unstable steady state, the evolution
of the economy may be subject to global indeterminacy. Thus, the trajectories leading to
either the superior or the inferior steady state overlap such that expectations determine
the equilibrium selection process. Outside the region of the overlap, initial conditions
(history) determine whether the inferior or the superior equilibrium is reached. Energy
taxes and the state of the economy, expressed by installed capital equipment, then de-
termine whether history or expectations shape the transition to the inferior or superior
14
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Figure 2: Phase diagram with overlap region in the {Kj , qj}-plane.
equilibrium. The reason is that energy taxes affect factor productivity and thus the shape
as well as the position of the ∆qj = 0-locus. In our framework qj relates to the net present
value of one additional unit of capital.8 This implies that the selection of the superior
(inferior) transition path must be associated to favorable (unfavorable) fundamentals in
an admissible fashion. An entrepreneur has optimistic expectations if she expects that
everybody else has optimistic expectations regarding the net-present value of additional
capital equipment. This is the common feature of self-fulfilling prophecy equilibria. In
an extreme case, energy policy determines even the number of equilibria: if factor pro-
ductivity (A˜d,t) is via high (low) energy taxes reduced (increased) drastically, only the
inferior (superior) equilibrium may survive.
Conceptually, the existence of an overlap region requires that the interior unstable
steady state is characterized by complex conjugate eigenvalues which assures that the
topology of the phase diagram allows for a transition from the left (right) of the interior
8Note that the last term in brackets of Eq. 25 represents the difference between MPKj and marginal
capital adjustment costs. Denote this difference by Z˜j , we obtain similar to a standard equity price model
under perfect foresight that qj,t =
(
1+r
1−δ
)−1∑∞
k′=1
(
1+r
1−δ
)−k′+1 Z˜j,t+k′
1−δ , such that qj corresponds indeed
to the net-present value of one additional unit of capital installed in the representative firm.
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steady state the superior (inferior) steady state. Below, we establish that the emergence
of an overlap region and its size is affected by the tax level τ . Environmental preferences
determining τ affect thus the relevance of history versus expectations for the equilibrium
selection process. In the following proposition, we summarize how both, the location of
the ∆q = 0-locus as well as the role of expectations depend on the total factor productivity
of technology j (A˜j). Note that A˜d,t is then affected by the strength of green preferences
(ε) which determine the energy tax (τ).
Proposition 3.
(i) An increase (decline) in total factor productivity A˜j moves the ∆qj = 0-locus in
the {Kj; qj}-plane upwards, such that for a given set of parameters, only the infe-
rior (superior) steady state survives if A˜j < A˜j,min (A˜j > A˜j,max). In both cases,
the dynamics of the economy is driven by initial conditions. The model exhibits
three steady states if A˜j ∈ [A˜j,min, A˜j,max]. The interior steady state exhibits real
eigenvalues if A˜j ≤ A˜j,crit and complex conjugate eigenvalues if A˜j > A˜j,crit.
(ii) If j = d, the ∆qj = 0-locus is moving downwards during the transition to the steady
state since ∂τt
∂Kd,t
> 0 and
∂A˜d,t
∂τt
< 0.
(iii) Higher ecological preferences induce higher energy taxes and a more pronounced
reduction of A˜d,t.
In light of the above proposition, the existence of three steady states requires that the
TFP lies within the interval [A˜j,min, A˜j,max].
9 In the dirty regime, the TFP is declining
if the energy tax is increasing during the transition to the steady state. This implies
that even though the model is initially characterized by the existence of three conditional
steady states only the inferior steady state may survive in the long-run. The risk that the
9Given that the compensating impact of mj(Kj) on the marginal product of capital is sufficiently
strong. For further details, see the mathematical appendix.
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superior steady state vanishes increases in the magnitude of environmental preferences
(ε) which increase energy taxes and induce thereby a more pronounced reduction in the
TFP. If the TFP is above A˜j,crit and within [A˜j,min, A˜j,max], the interior steady state is an
unstable spiral and the dynamic system allows for the existence of an overlap region, such
that expectations matter. At this stage, we can already conclude that high environmental
preferences reduce the likelihood of the emergence of an overlap region in the dirty regime
through increasing taxes and thereby potentially reduce the role of expectations compared
to history.
6 Numerical experiments
The overlap region and its response to economic policies can be detected numerically
only. For that reason we underpin the economic reasoning of our model with numerical
experiments. With a variable energy tax, A˜d,t is time-varying until the steady state is
reached and thus the position of the ∆qd = 0-locus as well. In order to isolate the effect
of τt on the size of the overlap regions, we illustrate the overlap region for an initial value
of the energy tax which is zero in our case and its steady state value in the superior
steady state which is τhigh∗ = 0.5462. We then present the dynamics of the energy tax
(τ), A˜d, and environmental quality (Q) for different degrees of environmental preferences
(ε). Finally, we discuss the emergence of a regime switch to the green technology with
different degrees of environmental preferences.
We set α = 0.3 and β = 0.18 such that the income share of energy is slightly above
0.1. The length of one period is around 30-35 years. A depreciation rate of 4% p.a.
implies δ = 0.3. Business cycle literature suggests a discount factor of 0.99 per quarter
for future consumption, such that ρ = 0.99120. As regards the investment cost function
we assume standard values, i.e. η = 1 which implies a quadratic cost function. The
remaining values are set as follows: γ = 0.1, Bd = 1, ψ = 0.0003, ε = 0.75; 1, Q¯ = 0.95
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and κ = 351. m(K) = σ(K)
σ(K)−1 , with σ = µ + µ¯K
2, where µ = 1.0251 and µ¯ = 1.25.
Ω = 0.25 which amounts to 1/8 of the steady state income level of one working cohort.
We shall emphasize that despite implementing a reasonable model calibration, our goal
is to characterize transitional dynamics qualitatively rather than quantitatively.
To start, we consider an economy that applies the dirty technology and imposes an
energy tax of τ = 0. Moreover, A˜d,t > A˜d,crit such that the interior steady state exhibits
two complex conjugate eigenvalues. In this case, there exists a region characterized by a
range of the state variable (Kd) around the interior unstable equilibrium (K
int
d,∗ ) in which
the equilibrium trajectories to the exterior steady states overlap. Within this overlap
region, the superior (inferior) steady state can be reached from the left (right) hand side
of the interior steady state. Thus, knowledge about the initial state of the economy
is insufficient for the selection of the equilibrium trajectory.10 The transition to the
superior (inferior) steady state is characterized by an associated qt,d above (below) its
long-run value (qd,∗). Since qj reflects the present value of an additional unit of physical
capital installed in the representative firm net of capital adjustment costs, qd,t ≷ qd,∗
implies thus that Id,t ≷ Id,∗. The long-run value qd,∗ is just sufficient to sustain the
steady state capital stock in the sense that depreciated capital is replaced by investments
(Isd,∗ = δK
s
d,∗, s = low, int, high). Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium trajectories in the
{Kd, qd}-plane to the exterior steady states. Moreover, it illustrates the effect of an
increasing energy tax during the transition from τ0 = 0 to τ∗ = 0.54624 which corresponds
to the steady state level of the superior steady state in the numerical experiment below.
Note that in Figure 3 the interior steady state has been normalized to one. Since ∂A˜d
∂τ
< 0,
the levels of the exterior steady states are reduced. The change in the total factor
productivity alters the size of the overlap region, indicated by the dashed compared to
10For the detection of the overlap range we apply the relaxation algorithm. For further details see
Trimborn et al., 2008). The minimum (maximum) feasible capital stock is reached if further reductions
(increases) in Kd,0 generate a numerical error outside an infinitesimal small epsilon environment around
zero.
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the dotted area. Apparently, the overlap region shrunk to the left of the interior steady
state and increased to the right of it. As a consequence, the potentially positive influence
of expectations for rather unfavorable initial conditions (Kd,0) is reduced. At the same
time, the overlap has grown in the area for comparatively favorable initial conditions,
thus, in the region where negative expectations can induce a transition to the inferior
steady state despite that the economy starts with favorable conditions. Hence, an energy
tax reduces the likelihood to reach the superior long-run equilibrium under unfavorable
initial conditions but optimistic expectations. In fact, an energy tax increases the risk
that the economy converges to the inferior steady state under comparatively favorable
initial conditions but pessimistic expectations.
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ܭௗ
Figure 3: Equilibrium trajectories to the superior/inferior steady state for different energy taxes (τ = 0
and τ = 0.5462). The interior unstable equilibrium has been normalized to 1.
We now illustrate the transition of the energy tax from zero to its steady state value
which may be 0 or positive depending on whether the economy is converging to the inferior
or superior steady state. The transition paths for the energy tax (τ), A˜d and environ-
mental quality (Q) for different degrees of environmental preferences (ε) are depicted in
in Figure 4. The inferior and the interior steady states are characterized by τ low∗ , τ
int
∗ = 0.
Since, the endogenous energy tax is an increasing function in Kd, the tax must become
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positive somewhere to the right of the interior steady state. While the transition to the
inferior steady state is characterized by τt = 0, the representative household supports an
energy tax at later stages of the transition to the superior steady state. The increase
in the energy tax reduces A˜d,t towards its steady state level. Therefore, the size of the
overlap is time varying during the transition to the steady state as well.
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Figure 4: Transition paths for the energy tax (τ), A˜d and environmental quality (Qd) for different degrees
of environmental preferences (ε).
The initial size corresponds to the τ = 0 case in Fig. 3 and approaches the τ = 0.5462-
case. Thus, the importance of expectations is changing during the transition. Initially,
for Kd,0 < K
int
d,∗ , the prospects to select the trajectory leading to the superior steady
state are more favorable during earlier stages of the transition. As the energy tax is
increasing at later stages, the overlap is declining to the left of the interior steady state
but increasing to the right of it. Thus, the risk to select the trajectory leading to the
inferior steady state, if expectations are pessimistic, is increasing. Higher preferences
for environmental quality (ε) increase the energy tax in the long-run. As societies with
higher environmental concerns impose a higher energy tax, the total factor productivity
is declining during the transition to the steady state to a lower level which is compen-
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sated from the welfare perspective by a higher level of environmental quality (Q). The
associated reduction in the overlap region leaves less room for a favorable economic de-
velopment if expectations are optimistic and the economy is located to the left of the
interior unstable steady state. On the other hand, the importance of expectations is in-
creasing to the right of the interior steady state. An economy located in this region could
reach the superior equilibrium if only history mattered. It faces, however, now the risk
that pessimistic expectations induce the selection of the trajectory to the inferior equilib-
rium. Nevertheless, our empirical motivation in the introduction suggests that societies
with higher ecological preferences tend to be more optimistic with respect to the future
economic development. Whether or not this is the case is indeed an empirical question
which needs to be more substantiated. We come back to this aspect in the subsequent
section. If, hypothetically, an economy characterized by a relatively high ε tends to be
more optimistic with respect to the future economic development, the risk that this econ-
omy will coordinate itself towards the inferior steady state may not be relevant. On the
other hand, the role of optimistic expectations to the left of the interior steady state is
reduced since the overlap region has shrunk in that area. In that sense, we can conclude
at least from a theoretical point of view that higher environmental concerns increase the
role of expectations under favorable initial conditions, while the overlap region is reduced
to the left of the interior equilibrium such that the equilibrium selection process becomes
there more history-dependent. Hence, optimistic expectations are of little help in this
region. If societies with higher ecological concerns tend to implement higher energy taxes,
the overlap region where optimistic expectations are supportive for the selection of the
superior equilibrium is reduced and increased in a region where optimistic expectation
may just prevent this societies from selecting the inferior transition path. Again, whether
or not this risk exists is an empirical question which will be analyzed in the subsequent
section.
21
Consider now the scenario of an endogenous regime switch, i.e. the representative
household compares the resulting lifetime utility levels in regime d and regime c support-
ing a regime switch, if Vc,t ≥ Vd,t, such that in light of Proposition 2
wc,t − Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHSV
≥ wd,t(
Qmax
Qt+1
) ε
(1+ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHSV
. (33)
In regime c environmental quality is disconnected from the production process. Thus,
environmental quality is at its maximum level (Qmax). Moreover A˜c is constant and so is
the size of the overlap region. In light of the previous discussion the size of the overlap
in regime c depends on A˜c. If the clean technology is sufficiently productive, the overlap
of the green technology may be larger to the left of the interior steady state compared to
regime d. Then, the regime switch increases the role of expectations compared to history
in this region and reduces the role of expectations to the right of the interior unstable
steady state. If households are more optimistic with respect to the future economic
development, the regime switch increases the likelihood that the superior equilibrium is
selected. This mechanism is reinforced by the magnitude of environmental preferences
which induce in regime d a faster decline in A˜d relative to A˜c.
In Figure 5, we depict the evolution of the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (33)
for different degrees of environmental preferences (ε). Higher environmental preferences
attach a higher weight to environmental quality, such that a higher ε shifts the RHS-
curve downwards. Consequently, societies with a higher ε switch earlier compared to
societies with a smaller ε.
So far we have assumed that the state collects energy taxes, but we have been silent
about the use of the tax revenues. Implicitly, we presumed that the state spends the
tax revenues unproductively. One could object that the conflict between ecological pref-
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erences and A˜d is biased due to the absence of measures reducing the conflict between
the polluting technology and the environment. We abstract from the existence of an
abatement technology since it is analytically less tractable and we do not gain more in-
formation in view of the research question of this paper. In the mathematical appendix,
we generalize our arguments with respect to the existence of an abatement technology
and show that the presence of tax-financed abatement measures does not constitute a
conflict regarding our arguments. If an abatement technology is active, the preferred tax
rate is still increasing in ε but also in the effectiveness of abatement measures, since the
marginal benefit of taxation (higher environmental quality) is increasing by more than
the marginal cost11.
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Figure 5: Regime switch to the clean regime for ε = 1 and ε = 0.75. RHSV =
wd,t
(Q
max
Qt+1
)
ε
(1+ρ)
and
LHSV = wt,c − Ω.
7 Robustness
Our small-open-economy assumption allows us to analyse the incentives for ambitious
environmental policies in countries with rather minor impacts on global pollution levels.
Following the logic of the Paris Agreement all countries commit to reduce their national
emissions. Despite most countries’ very low share of total global emissions, they all
11The latter holds at least for the long-run given that the production process deteriorates environ-
mental quality sufficiently strong. For further details refer to the mathematical appendix.
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handed in a pledge with their nationally determined contribution. One important, but
often neglected, element is that most policies aiming to mitigate climate change profit
from local side benefits, such as a reduction in polluting particles and noise (Hamilton
et al., 2017). Hence, our environmental quality should rather be interpreted as domestic
quality that can be improved with domestic measures. In the model we thus abstracted
from a global pollutant affecting domestic environmental quality. For the sake of clarity
we also assumed a regeneration capacity of the environment from one period to another
of 100%. In this section we extend the analysis to (1) incomplete regeneration of the
environment (0 < δQ < 1) and (2) the impact of global pollutants on the domestic
economy, resembling a global challenge like climate change. While the main reasoning
of our paper remains robust with respect to these changes, we obtain interesting results
regarding the timing of a switch from the polluting to the green energy regime and the
importance of expectations in the polluting regime.
(1) Incomplete regeneration of the environment (0 < δQ < 1): For 0 < δQ < 1,
the dynamics of the economy is governed by a three-dimensional system of difference
equations as described by (17), (24) and (25). Conceptually, δQ < 1 affects the level of
the preferred energy tax, therefore total factor productivity in the polluting regime (A˜d,t)
and hence the timing of the regime switch to the green regime. The immediate impact
of a reduced regeneration capacity is a reduction of environmental quality implying an
increase in the preferred energy tax ( ∂τt
∂δQ
< 0). Hence, total factor productivity A˜d,t
shrinks. With this information at hand, we are prepared to derive the impact of δQ on
the regime switch. Again a regime switch occurs if Vc,t ≥ Vd,t, where the fundamental
difference compared to (33) arises from the fact that environmental quality does not jump
to its maximum level after the regime switch but to Qc,t+1 = δQQ¯ + (1 − δQ)Qc,t, such
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that (33) transforms to
wc,t − Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHSV
≥ wd,t(
δQQ¯+(1−δQ)Qc,t
δQQ¯+(1−δQ)Qd,t−Pt
) ε
(1+ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHSV
. (34)
From the discussion above it follows that δQ reduces through higher energy taxes wd,t.
Moreover, for any given Qt and Pt, the denominator of RHS
V increases such that a lower
regeneration rate of the environment makes an earlier regime switch more likely.12 This
reasoning is depicted in Figure 7 in the appendix.
(2) Global pollutants: Owed to the small open economy assumption, the stock and
the evolution of global pollutants is exogenous to the domestic economy. Domestic
environmental quality is affected by the stock of domestic and global pollutants, i.e.
Qt+1 = Q¯− κgSglobalt+1 − St+1, such that
Qt+1 = δQQ¯t + (1− δQ)Qt − Pt, (35)
with Q¯t = Q¯− κg [S
global
t+1 +S
global
t ]
δQ
− κgSglobalt , where κg ≥ 0 represents the adverse impact of
global pollutants on domestic environmental quality.
Hence, increasing threats through climate change are captured by a decline in Q¯t and
the mitigation of climate change for example through the Paris Agreement would be
captured by an increase or a slower decline to a higher steady state value of Q¯t. Higher
climate risks increase the energy tax ( ∂τt
∂κg
> 0), reduce wd,t and increase everything else
equal the denominator of RHSV ,13 such that accelerated climate change makes an earlier
regime switch to the green energy regime more likely in the domestic economy. Finally,
the associated increase in energy taxes through a higher exposure to global pollutants
reduces the role of expectations in the polluting regime (see Fig. 8 in the appendix).
12Define Q˜t =
δQQ¯+(1−δQ)Qt
δQQ¯+(1−δQ)Qt−Pt , it follows that
∂Q˜t
∂δQ
= (Qt−Q¯)Pt
[δQQ¯+(1−δQ)Qt−Pt]2 < 0 as Q¯ ≥ Qt.
13 ∂Q˜t
∂Q¯
=
−δQPt
[δQQ¯+(1−δQ)Qt−Pt]2 < 0.
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8 Empirical Analysis
Our model proposes an interplay between ecological preferences and expectations about
the economic development. To derive implications for the real-life setting, we analyse
empirically whether there is a relationship between green preferences and expectations.
As introduced in section 1, beliefs about the future play an important role in economic
development by influencing current decision-making and thereby work as self-fulfilling
prophecies. The successful transition to a clean energy regime may thus depend on
people’s willingness to support environmental measures but also on their economic ex-
pectations. The factors driving positive or negative expectations are debated. Furnham
(1997) suggests that personal traits such as age, income, faith and political attitudes can
explain partly whether someone is more of an optimist or a pessimist. It is also assumed
that people include external information such as media information or historic economic
development in addition to emotional beliefs (e.g. Bafumi, 2011). A new strand of litera-
ture emphasises the current power of the preferred political party: people tend to be more
optimistic about the economy, if they are ideologically aligned with the party in power
(Stokes, 2017). Based on the Eurobarometer analysis shown in figure 1, we hypothesise
that there is also a relationship between environmental attitudes and expectations about
economic development. If people value environmental protection, they may be both;
willing to implement stricter policies in favour of the environment and more optimistic
that the new policies define a good framework for economic prosperity. Such optimism
may have gained momentum with scholars forecasting the creation of new jobs linked to
environmental-friendly industries (Fankhauer et al., 2008). Others argue that environ-
mental protection should be implemented soon, since it will become more expensive the
longer we wait (Stern, 2006). Following that argument, environmental measures depict
a necessity for future economic growth and thereby drive optimism. In our literature
research we could not find any data analysis that has addressed this question. One im-
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portant reason may be that there is little data available. Most of the opinion surveys and
thus the related analyses combine the two opinions in a contradicting question. Namely,
respondents have to choose which of the two they consider more important, either en-
vironmental protection or economic performance. This way data analysts are unable to
find a potentially positive relationship between the two attitudes.
Data
We use data from the Selects survey 2015, which is part of a long-term election study
by FORS Switzerland (Selects, 2017). The aim of this survey is to analyse and forecast
political participation and decision-making process of the Swiss population. The opinion
poll 2015 contains 4 different parts: a one-time survey after the elections, a panel survey
with 3 waves before and 1 wave after the elections, a media analysis and a candidates
survey. For our main analysis, we make use of the first part of the panel survey (wave
1) where participants are asked regarding a) their opinion about the necessity of stricter
measures for the environment and b) their expectations about the development of the
economy in Switzerland. Both questions are asked in a similar format. Respondents had
to choose on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly in favor” to “Strongly against”
with respect to the question: “Are you in favour of more environmental protection in
Switzerland?” and from “Improve significantly” to “Worsen significantly” for the question
“How do you expect the economic situation in Switzerland to be like in one year from
now”. A random, but representative sample with participants from all over Switzerland
was interviewed online. 11’047 people participated, out of which 5’618 men and 5’429
women. Due to missing data points we had to exclude 156 participants for the basic
estimation and further 384 participants for the estimations with more control variables.
As a starting point for the theoretical reasoning (see figure 1) we analysed data from
the Eurobarometer 2016 dataset. The standard Eurobarometer 85 census was carried
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out in May 2016 in 33 countries. It examines Europeans’ attitudes on the domestic and
European political situation, their main concerns and their perception of domestic and
EU institutions (Eurobarometer, 2016). In the survey 2016 interviewees are asked for
both, what they think are the most important issues affecting their country (max 2 is-
sues, free text) and their opinion on the future economic system (choice of the options
better, worse or equal). With a basic multi-stage random design in each country, a total
of 32’987 participants were interviewed.
Empirical Strategy
We use a multinomial ordinal logit regression model to test the effect of the attitude
regarding environmental protection on the likelihood to choose each option of the ques-
tion about economic expectations. We regress the environmental opinion variable on the
expectations variable, controlling for 2 groups of variables: socio-economic variables and
political opinion variables. In the group of socioeconomic variables we control for house-
hold income, highest education degree, sex, age and canton of residence. In the group of
political opinion variables we control for the respondent’s party choice and which prob-
lem area is considered to be the most important. Following the findings in the literature
about the importance of the party in power to shape expectations, we also control for the
expectations about which party is going to win (and would thus gain more or less power
in the political decision-making process). For that, we create a binary dummy variable
based on two questions in the survey. We combine the answer about the party choice of
the respondent with the expectations whether this same party is going to win or loose in
the coming elections. For respondents who think that their party is very likely to win,
we assign a value of 1, for the others a value of 0.
Results
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Our analysis indicates that expectations about the economic development differ for people
with different environmental attitudes. While the distribution of the answer patterns is
alike, interviewees who strongly disagree to have stricter environmental protection seem
to be less optimistic with respect to the economic development (see figure 6). Put the
other way, people who indicate that they are in favour of stricter environmental measures
tend to have more optimistic expectations about the future of the economy.
Figure 6: Relationship between attitudes on environmental protection and economic expectations. Data:
Selects, 2015.
In table 1 the reader can see that the coefficient measuring the attitude on environmen-
tal protection is highly significant. In column (1) we control for socioeconomic variables
only. In column (2) we include the answers on the party choice and the most important
problem area to be solved. In column (3) we also control for whether the respondent is
confident that the respondent’s elected party is very likely to win in the elections. The
interpretation is as following: the log odds for being less optimistic increase significantly
for people who disagree with stricter environmental protection. Thus, for respondents
who do not strongly agree to more strict environmental measurements (which is the ref-
erence scenario) the ordered log-odds that they also respond more pessimistic regarding
the economic development increase by 0.077. The data analysis also indicates that female
respondents are more likely to be pessimistic about economic development compared to
male respondents, whereas we do not find a significant impact of age.
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Decrease in positive economic expectations:
(1) (2) (3)
Disagreement to environmental protection 0.088∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Sex (female) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Age 0.0005 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household income group X X X
Education level X X X
Canton X X X
Most important problem X X
(summarised to 9 problem areas)
Party choice X X
(out of main 7 parties)
Preferred political party is going to win X
AIC 21’178.59 20’291.56 20’285.91
Observations 10,891 10’507 10’507
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1: Multinomial ordinal logit regression. The coefficient indicating that a participant disagrees to
more environmental protection (compared to the baseline of strong agreement) significantly increases the
log odds of choosing a more pessimistic answer option regarding expectations about economic development.
Data: Selects, 2015.
In table 2 we separately analysed each answer option with the baseline scenario. One
can see that the coefficient is highly significant for the respondents who are strongly
against environmental measures compared to the ones who are strongly in favor. The
interpretation is that for a male participant who is strongly against stricter environmental
measures, the ordered log-odds of being more pessimistic about the economic development
increases by 0.582 compared to the baseline scenario (someone who is strongly in favor of
more strict environmental measures), ceteris paribus all other variables. The coefficient
is positive and increases for all answers compared to the baseline (from rather in favor to
strongly against). However the coefficients are only significant for the participants who
are neither in favor nor against and the ones who are strongly against.
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Value Std. Error t value p value
Rather in favor 0.079 0.051 1.555 0.120
Neither in favor nor against 0.132 0.064 2.057 0.040∗∗
Rather against 0.143 0.089 1.620 0.105
Strongly against 0.582 0.147 3.948 0.000∗∗∗
Table 2: Separate analysis for environmental opinion variable on expectations about economic develop-
ment. The log odds for choosing a more pessimistic answer option (compared to the baseline Improve
significantly) is highly significant for people who strongly disagree to environmental protection compared
to the ones who strongly support it. Data: Selects, 2015.
Robustness checks
As a robustness test we create a dichotomous dummy variable for participants who are
either in favor or against environmental measures. Including this variable instead of the
5 scale answer variable, the results remain significant on a 5% level14.
In order to exclude multicollinearity between the variables, we apply a variance inflation
factor (VIF) test. The variable of interest has a VIF test coefficient of 1.396 only and we
can thus be confident to exclude multicollinearity issues for our variable15.
A standard issue with such questionnaires is that participants differ in their general re-
sponse behaviour due to personal traits. It is for example possible that some people are
generally more worried than others. In wave 3 of the panel survey respondents are asked
to rate themselves on a 10-point scale whether 1) they consider themselves as a person
that is often worried and 2) if they are usually relaxed in stressful situations. We run
the same regression including those two variables. The coefficient of interest remains
significant on the 1% level16.
Discussion
Our empirical analysis sheds light on the relationship between environmental attitudes
and economic expectations. The results of the data analysis show that interviewees who
14The sample size is reduced to 8’664 participants, since we exclude those who chose the neutral
answer option.
15Also all control variables have VIF coefficients below 2, except for the newly created variable assess-
ing the participants expectations about their preferred party to win which is partly based on the party
choice variable that is included in the analysis as well.
16The sample is reduced to 7’324 participants due to (normal) dropouts during a panel survey.
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are in favour of stricter environmental protection also tend to be more optimistic with
respect to economic expectations. This supports our hypothesis that is based of the initial
analysis of the Eurobarometer 2016 dataset. Moreover it questions common wisdom that
people are in favour either of green policies or economic development.
The findings can be used for the discussion of the dynamics along the saddle path and
thus projections about the steady state in our model. The observation of a relationship
between pro-environmental attitudes and optimistic expectations (and vice versa) implies
that a) if societies with higher ecological concerns tend to implement higher energy taxes,
the overlap region where optimistic expectations are supportive for the selection of the
superior equilibrium is reduced and increased in a region where pessimistic expectations
are influential. Nevertheless, their high degree of optimism may prevent this economies
to converge to the inferior steady state. b) If societies with higher ecological concerns
assume an earlier regime switch, their high degree of optimism likely drives a transition
to the superior steady state.
The survey is created such that the Swiss population is well represented. However, the
reader should be aware of some common, immanent limitations linked to such samples, in
particular self-selection biases, dishonest response behaviour and a certain under- or over-
representation of subgroups of the population. One particular limitation is that people’s
opinions may differ greatly when it comes to the acceptance of concrete policy instruments
(eg. Vimentis, 2018). Our dataset describes people’s general attitudes with respect to
more environmental protection but does not specifically ask about a tax as assumed in
the model. However, we think that we mitigated this potential, rather uncircumventable
conflict by our modeling strategy, since we considered a rather stylized and general tax
instrument.
Also, note that the largest share of the survey participants are neither optimists nor
pessimists. However, the overall number of pessimists is higher than the number of
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optimists. Hence, even with a more environmental-friendly population the risk of taking
the saddle path to the inferior steady state is decreased but still substantial. From a
policy-making perspective, this finding calls for additional analysis and research whether
and if so how it is possible to shape expectations to become more optimistic.
9 Conclusions
In an overlapping generations model with multiple steady states, we analysed the impact
of endogenous environmental policies on the relevance of history and expectations for
the equilibrium selection process. We considered two production regimes: a polluting
regime with an endogenous energy tax and a clean regime subject to switching costs. In
the polluting regime, an increasing energy tax raises under pessimistic expectations the
risk that the economy transits to the inferior equilibrium. The reason for this dilemma
is rooted in the adverse effect of energy taxes on the total factor productivity in the
polluting regime. The reduction in total factor productivity reduces incomes in the short
and long-run and it reduces the region of state variables in which positive expectations
matter for the equilibrium selection process, but increases the region where negative
expectations matter (overlap region).
We have shown that a switch from dirty to clean production depends on the productiv-
ity of both technologies, on the level of pollution and on the preferences of the households
for environmental quality. With an endogenous energy tax the size of the overlap is time-
varying. An early increase in the tax (due to strong environmental preferences) decreases
the factor productivity gap between the two technologies. A switch to clean production
occurs earlier and decreases the trade-off between environmental preferences and total
factor productivity. Thus, higher preferences for the protection of the environment imply
an earlier switch to the clean energy regime. In this regime, the conflict between produc-
tion and environmental preferences is not only resolved, but the prospects to select the
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superior equilibrium have increased, since this regime gives more space to expectations
compared to history, given that the productivity of the clean technology is sufficiently
high.
In an empirical data analysis from a large election survey in Switzerland we find that
people with strong environmental preferences are more likely to also have more opti-
mistic expectations about the economic development. The positive relationship between
environmental preferences and economic optimism scrutinises the common wisdom that
people are either in favour of the environment or economic development.The findings
have important implications for the steady state analysis of our model: in a policy sce-
nario without switching possibilities, the likelihood to reach the inferior stable steady
state is low, due to the generally optimistic expectations (despite that the area where
positive expectations matter becomes smaller). Second, for societies with strong envi-
ronmental preferences the switch to a clean production happens faster, because they will
support higher energy taxes which makes an early switch more attractive. Thanks to
their optimistic expectations the likelihood to reach the superior steady state increases.
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Mathematical Appendix (not for publication)
Equilibrium
Without loss of generality we impose the standard assumptions of a symmetric equi-
librium in the intermediate sector, such that cxj = cxj(ωj), pxj = pxj(ωj), and xj =
xj(ωj) ∀ ωj, while average energy productivity is Bj and average fixed costs φj. Free en-
try drives profits down to zero, such that pxjxj = cxj(xj + φj). Noting that pxj = mj cxj ,
we obtain
xj,t =
φj
mj,t − 1 . (36)
Denoting further aggregate quantities of a variable by upper-case letters, the available
number of services compatible to technology j is obtained as
Nj,t =
(mj,t − 1)BjEβj,tL1−βj
φj mj,t
, (37)
such that Fj,t reads as17
Fj,t = (Kj,t)α ·
(
BjE
β
j,tL
1−β
j
mj,t
)1−α
. (38)
According to (38), the output level grows with total factor productivity in the production
of energy services and the inputs capital, energy, and labor, while a higher markup
decreases final output. We normalize aggregate labor supply to unity, such that
Ld = 1, if j = d, (39)
Lc + LE,c = 1, if j = c. (40)
17In order to ease the notation, we modified the production function of final output slightly, in
the sense that now Fj = (Kj)α
[
N
1−mj
j
( ∫ Nj
0
xj(ωj)
1
mj dωj
)mj]1−α
= (Kj)
α
[
N
1−mj
j N
mj
j xj
]1−α
=
(Kj)
α(Njxj)
1−α, which is a standard procedure in literature, see Jaimovich (2007).
36
In regime (d) profit maximizing behavior implies pEd,t =
∂Yd,t
∂Ed,t
, such that aggregate de-
mand for fossils is obtained as
Ed,t =
( ψ
(τt)z
)− γ
γ˜
( β˜
p¯Ed + τt
) 1
γ˜
( Bd
md,t
) 1−α
γ˜
(
Kd,t
)α
γ˜
(41)
with β˜ = (1− α)β and γ˜ = 1− β˜ + γ.
In regime c, aggregate energy supply is produced domestically according to (13). The
labor market equilibrium implies
LE,c = β (42)
Lc = 1− β. (43)
The preferred tax rate
The objective function of the representative household reads as
Vd,t = (1 + ρ) ln(wd,t) + ε ln(Qd,t+1) + ρ˜. (44)
Hence,
∂Vd,t
∂τt
=
(1 + ρ)
wd,t
∂wd,t
∂τt
+
ε
Qt+1
∂Qt+1
∂τt
. (45)
(i) No abatement (z = 0)
a. δQ = 1 : The first order condition of the representative household reads
∂Vd,t
∂τt
= −(1 + ρ)(β˜ − γ)
γ˜
+
κψε
(
ψ−γ β˜
p¯E+τt
) 1
γ˜
(
B
mt
) 1−α
γ˜
(
Kd,t
)α
γ˜
Q¯− κψ
(
ψ−γ β˜
p¯E+τt
) 1
γ˜
(
B
mt
) 1−α
γ˜
(
Kd,t
)α
γ˜
= 0,(46)
such that the preferred tax rate is obtained as
τt = β˜ψ
−γ
( B
mt
)1−α(
Kd,t
)α[κψ[(β˜ − γ)(1 + ρ) + ε]
Q¯(1 + ρ)(β˜ − γ)
]γ˜
− p¯E, (47)
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where γ˜ = 1− β˜ + γ.
Hence: ∂τt
∂Kt
, ∂τt
∂ε
> 0.
b. 0 < δQ < 1 : In this case Qt+1 = δQQ¯+ (1− δ)Qt − Pt and
τt = β˜ψ
−γ
( B
mt
)1−α(
Kd,t
)α [ κψ[(β˜ − γ)(1 + ρ) + ε]
[δQQ¯+ (1− δ)Qt](1 + ρ)(β˜ − γ)
]γ˜
−p¯E. (48)
Since ∂Qt+1
∂δQ
= Q¯ − Qt > 0 it follows that the denominator in the first line of
the above equation increases such that ∂τt
∂δQ
< 0.
c. κg > 0 and 0 < δQ < 1 : In this case Qt+1 = δQQ¯t + (1 − δ)Qt − Pt, where
Q¯t = Q¯− κg [S
global
t+1 +S
global
t ]
δQ
− κgSglobalt and
τt = β˜ψ
−γ
( B
mt
)1−α(
Kd,t
)α [κψ[(β˜ − γ)(1 + ρ) + ε]
Q¯t(1 + ρ)(β˜ − γ)
]γ˜
− p¯E. (49)
Higher exposure to global pollutants is reflected by an increase in κg. As
∂Q¯t
∂κg
< 0 it follows that ∂τt
∂κg
> 0.
(ii) With abatement (z ∈ (0, 1))
Summary of the reasoning
Consider now the presence of abatement measures (Mt) financed by state. The level
of pollutants is determined by
Pt =
{
ψEd,t
Mt
=
ψE1−zd,t
τzt
, z ∈ [0, 1) if Ed,t > Ecritd
ψ˜, if 0 ≤ Ed,t ≤ Ecritd or j = c.
(50)
z reflects the productivity of abatement measures. If z = 0, the abatement technol-
ogy is inactive, the case considered so far, and z < 1 excludes perfect abatement.
Similarly, environmental quality is specified as follows
Qt+1 =
{
Q¯− κψE
1−z
d,t
τzt
, with z ∈ [0, 1), if j = d,
Q¯− κψ˜ = Qmax if 0 ≤ Ed,t ≤ Ecritd or j = c.
(51)
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For z ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium of the economy changes only in so far as γ˜ reads now
γ˜ = 1− β˜ + γ(1− z). (52)
Moreover, A˜d is obtained as
A˜d,t =
(
β˜
p¯Ed + τt
) β˜−γ(1−z)
γ˜ (
ψ
τ zt
)− γ
γ˜
. (53)
In regime d, we obtain as the indirect utility function
Vd,t = (1 + ρ) lnwd,t + ε ln
(
Q¯− κψE
1−z
d,t
τ zt
)
+ ρ˜, (54)
while Vc,t remains obviously unaffected. The subsequent proposition summarizes the
reaction of τt in response to changes in the capital stock, shifts in the preferences
for environmental quality, and the efficiency of abatement measures.
Proposition 4. (i) The first-order condition of the government reads
∂Vd,t
∂τt
=
(1 + ρ)
wd,t
∂wd,t
∂A˜d,t
∂A˜d,t
∂τt
− ε[κψ(1− z)E
−z
d,t
∂Ed,t
∂τt
− E1−zd,t zτ−1t ]
[Q¯− κψE
1−z
d,t
τzt
]τ zt
≤ 0, (55)
where
∂A˜d,t
∂τt
,
∂Ed,t
∂τt
< 0 and
∂wd,t
∂A˜d,t
> 0.
(ii) If z ∈ (0, 1), the energy tax is increasing in the capital stock (Kt) and envi-
ronmental preferences (ε), i.e. ∂τt
Kt
, ∂τt
ε
> 0.
So far, the response of the tax rate with respect to changes in the capital stock and
environmental preferences is qualitatively the same for 0 < z < 1 compared to z = 0.
The second part of this sections deals with changes in τ in response to changes in
z. Since z increases A˜d it increases the marginal cost of taxation. Clearly, a higher
effectiveness of the abatement technology increases also the marginal benefit. The
tax rate increases in response to increases in z, if the latter increase exceeds the
increase in the marginal costs. Analytical results are only obtainable for Q¯ = 0,
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in the sense that ∂τt
∂z
> 0. If Q˜ > 0, the marginal benefit of taxation depends
on the difference between Q¯ and the level of pollutants. If environmental quality
is sufficiently low, the marginal benefit from taxation is strong enough, such that
again ∂τt
∂z
> 0. Hence, a higher effectiveness of abatement measures support higher
taxes, such that the presence of productive abatement measures works in the same
direction as our previous discussion and not as one might think against the reasoning
presented in the previous sections.
ε = 1
z = 0.001 z = 0.005 z = 0.01 z = 0.05 z = 0.1
K low∗ 0.0955 0.0934 0.0917 0.0814 0.0716
Khigh∗ 2.8583 2.8136 2.76548 2.4738 2.19355
τ low∗ 0.0039 0.019 0.0482 0.2001 0.40163
τhigh∗ 0.4892 0.5412 0.6001 0.9551 1.30289
ε = 0.75
z = 0.001 z = 0.005 z = 0.01 z = 0.05 z = 0.1
K low∗ 0.09565 0.0935 0.0918 0.0816 0.0718
Khigh∗ 2.9175 2.8642 2.8108 2.5074 2.2226
τ low∗ 0.0039 0.019 0.03932 0.1970 0.3950
τhigh∗ 0.1729 0.2523 0.3236 0.6884 1.02341
Table 3: The impact of increasing effectiveness of abatement measures (z) on energy taxes in steady
state (τ) and the relative distance of the exterior steady states to the interior steady state under different
degrees of environmental preferences (ε).
Table 3 presents the numerical results for the impact of an increase in the effective-
ness of abatement measures z on the energy tax and the relative distance of the
inferior and the superior steady states to the interior steady state. Obviously, an
increase in z increases the marginal benefit of taxation by more than it raises the
costs, such that τ increases. This reduces A˜d and therefore the relative distances of
the exterior steady states to the interior steady state. Hence an increase in z does
not change the results of our paper but reenforces the mechanisms described here.
Further details of the reasoning
For z ∈ (0, 1) closed form solutions for τt are not obtainable. We thus make use of
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the Implicit function theorem. Note, that
∂wd,t
∂τt
= (1− α)(1− β)
( B
mt
) 1−α
γ˜
(
Kd,t
)α
γ˜ ∂A˜d,t
∂τt
(56)
∂Qt+1
∂τt
= −κψ
(1− z)E−zd,t ∂Ed,t∂τt − z
(
Ed,t
)1−z
τ z−1t
(τt)z
. (57)
An interior solution exists, if
∂wd,t
∂τt
< 0 and
∂Qd,t
∂τt
> 0.
∂wd,t
∂τt
< 0 requires that
∂A˜d,t
∂τt
< 0 which is the case if
(γ − β˜)τt + γzp¯E < 0. (58)
∂Qd,t
∂τt
> 0 if
∂Ed,t
∂τt
< 0 which is the case if
(γz − 1)τt + γzp¯E < 0. (59)
It can be shown that the violation of (58) implies a violation of (59).18 In light of
the Implicit function theorem it follows that
∂τt
∂Kt
= −
∂F
∂Kt
∂F
∂τt
, (60)
with F =
∂Vd,t
∂τt
. A maximum of Vd,t requires that
∂F
∂τt
=
∂2Vd,t
∂(τt)2
< 0, sucht that
sign ∂τt
∂Kt
= sign ∂F
∂Kt
. As ∂F
∂Kt
> 0 if (59) holds, we obtain ∂τt
∂Kt
> 0.
As regards the reaction of the preferred tax rate in response to a change in envi-
ronmental preferences (ε), we obtain similarly
∂τt
∂ε
= −
∂F
∂ε
∂F
∂τt
, (61)
18Assuming that (γz − 1)τt + γzp¯E = 0 implies γzp¯E = τt(1 − γz). Thus, (γ − β˜)τt + γzp¯E =
(γ − β˜)τt + τt(1 − γz) = τt(1 − β˜ + γ(1 − z)) = τtγ˜ which is positive and not negative, such that (58)
holds only if (59) holds and vice versa.
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such that sign∂τt
∂ε
= sign∂F
∂ε
. Since, ∂F
∂ε
is obtained as
∂F
∂ε
=
−ψκ[(γz − 1)τt + γzp¯E]Ed,t
(p¯E + τt)(Q¯− κψEd,t)γ˜τt (62)
and (γz − 1)τt + γzp¯E is in light of (59) smaller zero, it follows that ∂F∂ε > 0 and
∂τt
∂ε
> 0.
The sign of ∂τt
∂z
equals the sign of ∂F
∂z
. Observing (45), we obtain
∂F
∂z
= −(1 + ρ)
(wd,t)2
∂wd,t
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂wd,t
∂τt︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
(1 + ρ)
wd,t
∂wd,t
∂τt∂z
− ε
(Qt+1)2
∂Qd,t
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂Qd,t
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
ε
Qt+1
∂Qd,t
∂τt∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.(63)
Analytical results are obtainable for Q¯ = 0. In this case, the indirect utility function
of the representative household is reads as
Vd,t = (1 + ρ) ln(wd,t)− ε ln(Pt) + ρ˜. (64)
∂(1 + ρ) ln(wd,t)
∂τt∂z
=
γ
(
(p¯E + τt) γ +
(
−β˜ + 1
)
p¯E − β˜τt
)
(1 + ρ)
(p¯E + τt)
(
β˜ − 1 + (z − 1) γ
)2
τt
> 0 (65)
∂ − ε ln(Pt)
∂τt∂z
=
(1− β˜)[(1 + γ − β˜)p¯E + (γ − β˜)τt]
(p¯E + τt)
(
β˜ − 1 + (z − 1) γ
)2
τt
> 0, (66)
such that ∂F
∂z
> 0 for Q¯ = 0 and thus ∂τt
∂z
> 0. From (63), we see that
∂(1+ρ) ln(wd,t)
∂τt∂z
is also positive. However, as Q¯ > 0, the marginal benefit is weighted by the en-
vironmental quality and increasing if the quality is sufficiently low. Analytically,
the sign of ∂F
∂z
is therefore ambiguous. However, a declining environmental quality
during the transition to the steady state makes the emergence of ∂F
∂z
> 0 and thus
∂τt
∂z
> 0 likely.
Multiple steady states
The necessary condition for the emergence of multiple steady states hinges on the com-
pensating effect of mj(Kj) on the marginal product of capital.
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(i) Exogenous mark-ups: if mj is constant and independent from Kj, there exists a
unique saddle-point stable steady state.
(ii) Endogenous mark-ups: if mj = mj(Kj), and κ > 1
(a) limK→0
∂Yc,t+1
∂Kc,t+1
=∞ and limK→∞ ∂Yc,t+1∂Kc,t+1 = 0.
(b) The necessary condition for multiple steady states in regime (d) is
∂A˜d
∂Kd
− A˜d(1− α)γ˜ ∂md
∂Kd
m−1d + (αγ˜ − 1)A˜dK−1d = 0, (67)
with γ˜ = 1−αβ
1+β+γ(1−z) and
−A˜c∂mc
∂Kc
m−1c − A˜cK−1c = 0, (68)
if j = c.
Robustness
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Figure 7: Regime switch to the green energy regime, transition paths for TFP (A˜d), the energy tax (τd)
and environmental quality (Qd) for different different regeneration capacities of the environment (δQ);
ε = 0.75.
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Figure 8: Declining role of expectations under increasing exposure to global climate risks (δQ = 0.8).
Global pollutants increase by 50% over the transition period, κg = {0; 0.1; 0.25}, ε = 0.75.
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Stability properties for δQ = 1 and 0 < δQ < 1
(i) δQ = 1: The dynamic system is given by (24) and (25). The associated Jacobian
reads as [
∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂Kj,t+1
∂Kj,t
]
, (69)
where the first line is obtained from the Implicit function theorem. It can be further
shown that in steady state
∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
=
δ1−ηK∗
η(1 + η)θ
> 0 (70)
∂Kj,t+1
∂Kj,t
= 1. (71)
The eigenvalues are therefore obtained from
(∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
− λ
)
(1− λ)− ∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
= 0 (72)
and read as
λ1,2 =
∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
+ 1
2
±
√√√√ [∂qj,t+1∂qj,t + 1]2
4
+
∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
− ∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
(73)
(ii) 0 < δQ < 1: The dynamic system is given by (24), (25) and (17), such that the
associated Jacobian reads as
∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
0
∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂Kj,t+1
∂Kj,t
0
0
∂Qj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂Qj,t+1
∂Qj,t
 . (74)
In this case the eigenvalues are obtained from
(∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
− λ
)[
(1− λ)
(∂Qj,t+1
∂Qj,t
− λ
)]
− ∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
(∂Qj,t+1
∂Qj,t
− λ
)
= 0 (75)
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and are given by (73) and
λ3 =
∂Qj,t+1
∂Qj,t
= (1− δQ) < 1. (76)
Hence, the results of the stability analysis of the two dimensional system translate
directly into the three-dimensional case. The emergence of an overlap region hinges
on the existence of conjugate complex eigenvalues. Conjugate complex eigenvalues
exist if
[∂qj,t+1
∂qj,t
− 1
]2
< −4∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
. (77)
The left-handside of the above inequality is positive. Moreover,
∂Kj,t+1
∂qj,t
=
δ1−ηKj,∗
η(1+η)θ
is
positive. It can be shown (see below) that sign of
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
is ambiguous. If
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
> 0
inequalit (77) is violated. Implying that for the two exterior steady states
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
> 0.
If the interior unstable steady state exhibits complex conjugate eigenvalues it must
thus hold that
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
< 0.
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
can be obtained from applying the Implicit function
theorem as
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
=
1
1−δ
∂2Yj,t+1
∂K2j,t+1
∂Kj,t+1
∂Kj,t
− δ
1−δ − 1
(78)
Obviously,
∂qj,t+1
∂Kj,t
<, if
∂2Yj,t+1
∂K2j,t+1
> 0 which shows again that endogenous mark-ups being
responsible for the non-monotonous behavior of the marginal product of capital are es-
sential. As moreover, the marginal product of physical capital is increasing in total factor
productivity (A˜j,t), the emergence of complex conjugate eigenvalues in deed depends also
on the level of A˜j,t given that
∂2Yj,t+1
∂K2j,t+1
> 0.
Summary of parameters and variables
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Parameter / Variable Explanation
Indices
t time index
j regime index; d = dirty, c = clean
Households
c consumption
w wage
s savings
R, r interest rate
V life-time utility
ρ discount factor for future consumption
 weight/importance of environmental quality
Environment
Q quality of the environment
S pollution stock
P pollution flow
δQ regeneration rate of the environment
ψ emission intensity per unit of energy
ψ˜ minimal level of pollution
κg impact of global pollutant on domestic Q
Production
Y final output
F applied technology (d or c)
γ adverse effect of pollution on productivity
A total factor productivity of final good
α output elasticity (final good)
K input factor: physical capital
I capital investment
δ depreciation rate of capital
η steers convexity of capital adjustment costs
θ capital adjustment costs
ω type of energy service
x quantity of energy service (ω) used
N range of energy services
sj elasticity of substitution
B total factor productivity of intermediate good (energy services)
β output elasticity (intermediate good)
φ fixed costs for production of intermediate good
E, e input factor: energy
l input factor: labour
pi intermediates’ profits
m markup
p price for intermediate good
cx marginal production costs intermediate good
Policy
τ tax on dirty energy
Ω switching costs
Table 4: Overview of all variables and parameters used in the model
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